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ESSAY 
 
DO BOUMEDIENE RIGHTS EXPIRE? 
ANDREW KENT† 
INTRODUCTION 
In recent weeks, a dispute has developed between the Obama Admin-
istration and lawyers representing detainees housed at the U.S. facility in 
Guantanamo Bay, Cuba. In court filings, the government suggested that, 
once a habeas corpus case has terminated adversely to a detainee, the 
detainee’s lawyers may no longer access classified information or meet with 
their clients on the same terms that were allowed during the proceedings.1 
Though the district court summarily rejected the government’s position,2 
this seemingly minor dispute is just the tip of the iceberg. As Guantanamo 
detainees’ first round of habeas cases come to an end, and as the U.S 
military deployment in Afghanistan reaches its denouement, the courts will 
have to address the much bigger issue of whether Boumediene v. Bush3 
granted rights to Guantanamo detainees that have now expired.  
In Boumediene, the Supreme Court held that Guantanamo detainees had 
a constitutional right to habeas corpus review to determine whether they 
were properly held as enemy combatants, even though the detainees were 
noncitizens imprisoned outside the sovereign territory of the United 
 
† Associate Professor, Fordham Law School; Faculty Advisor, Center on National Security 
at Fordham Law School. Thanks to Abner Greene, Joe Landau, Ethan Leib, Deborah Pearlstein, 
Martha Rayner, and Steve Vladeck for helpful comments. 
1 See Benjamin Wittes, On Continued Counsel Access at Gitmo and the Government’s Filing, 
LAWFARE (July 27, 2012, 8:06 AM), http://www.lawfareblog.com/2012/07/on-continued-counsel-
access-at-gitmo-and-the-governments-filing/. 
2 See In re Guantanamo Detainee Continued Access to Counsel, No. 12-398, 2012 WL 
4039707, at *8 (D.D.C. Sept. 6, 2012) (rejecting the government’s attempt to modify detainees’ 
counsel access to classified information and meetings with their clients).  
3 553 U.S. 723 (2008). 
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States.4 In the Court’s view, the non-habeas review processes provided for 
alleged enemy combatants were insufficient to justify the prolonged 
detention of people who claimed to be innocent civilians.5 But now, several 
years later, many detainees have had their day in court and have lost their 
habeas cases; the federal courts have found them to be enemy fighters6 who 
may be detained for the duration of the United States’ armed conflict with 
al Qaeda and affiliated groups.7 Though the Obama Administration seems 
content to avoid the issue for now,8 future presidential administrations 
seem likely to ask whether persons found to be enemy fighters by Article 
III courts continue to have a constitutional right under Boumediene to access 
the federal courts for additional legal claims, including habeas. If the 
detainees’ Boumediene rights have expired, they would presumably have no 
right to counsel either, hence the significance of the current dispute about 
counsel access. 
 
4 Id. at 798. The Court stated that “at least three factors [were] relevant in determining the 
reach of the Suspension Clause: (1) the citizenship and status of the detainee and the adequacy of 
the process through which that status determination was made; (2) the nature of the sites where 
apprehension and then detention took place; and (3) the practical obstacles inherent in resolving 
the prisoner’s entitlement to the writ.” Id. at 766. Relying partially on the finding that Guantanamo 
was “[i]n every practical sense . . . not abroad,” id. at 769, the Court held that the Suspension 
Clause had full effect at Guantanamo, and the executive and judicial processes substituted for 
habeas were inadequate, id. at 792. 
5 Id. at 794-95. 
6 The Bush Administration used the now-familiar term “enemy combatants” to describe al 
Qaeda and Taliban fighters, but the Obama Administration has dropped the term. As a shorthand 
reference that describes both the detainees who fall within the war on terror detention authoriza-
tion described in infra note 7 and enemy soldiers in prior traditional conflicts such as World War 
II, I have chosen the intentionally generic term “enemy fighters.” 
7 Under post-Boumediene law elaborated by the D.C. Circuit, the government may detain a 
person under Congress’s post-9/11 Authorization for the Use of Military Force (AUMF) if the 
detainee admits, or the government shows by a preponderance of the evidence, that the detainee 
is, among other things, “part of al Qaeda or the Taliban,” Uthman v. Obama, 637 F.3d 400, 402 
(D.C. Cir. 2011), or that he “purposefully and materially support[ed]” al Qaeda or Taliban forces 
“in hostilities against U.S. Coalition partners,” id. at 402 n.2 (quoting Al-Bihani v. Obama, 590 
F.3d 866, 872 (D.C. Cir. 2010)). See also National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 
2012, Pub. L. No. 112-81, § 1021, 125 Stat. 1298, 1562 (2011) (authorizing detention “pending 
disposition under the law of war” of any person who “planned, authorized, committed, or aided” 
the 9/11 attacks or “was a part of or substantially supported al-Qaeda, the Taliban, or associated 
forces that are engaged in hostilities against the United States or its coalition partners”). 
8 The Administration recently told a district court judge in a dispute about access to counsel 
that “[t]he Government does not contend, for example, that the right to habeas review recognized 
in Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723 (2008), is extinguished once a detainee’s initial habeas 
petition is dismissed, or even denied. Detainees retain the right, in appropriate circumstances, to 
file successive petitions.” Respondent’s Combined Opposition to Motions by Detainees Al-
Mudafari, Al-Mithali, Ghanem, Al-Baidany, Esmail, and Uthman for Continued Counsel Access 
Pursuant to the Protective Order at 2, In re Guantanamo Bay Detainee Continued Access to 
Counsel, No. 12-398, 2012 WL 3542496 (D.D.C. Aug. 16, 2012), 2012 WL 3193560. 
Kent.docx (DO NOT DELETE) 11/13/2012 12:53 PM 
22 University of Pennsylvania Law Review PENNumbra [Vol. 161: 20 
There is no easy answer to the question whether confirmed enemy 
fighters have any right to continued court access once they have exercised 
their Boumediene rights and lost. This Essay first highlights and frames the 
question about the possible expiration of Boumediene rights, then sketches 
how a court could answer that question. The Essay then demonstrates that 
the possible expiration of Boumediene rights to court access raises questions 
about the subject matter jurisdiction of the federals courts (as well as civil 
capacity to sue, individual constitutional rights, and separation of powers). 
Thus, the courts have a duty to raise the issue sua sponte, and the President 
lacks legal authority to waive the argument. Finally, the Essay suggests 
policy reasons why the executive branch might be wise to avoid an argu-
ment about whether Boumediene rights have expired. 
I. THE DETAINEES AND THEIR LITIGATION 
As part of the post-9/11 “war on terror,” President Bush chose to detain 
noncitizens accused of membership in al Qaeda or the Taliban at a military 
facility at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, on territory leased by the United States 
since 1903. The United States does not consider Guantanamo to be its 
sovereign territory.9 Habeas corpus petitions were soon filed on behalf of 
some detainees—a move the government resisted. In 2004, the Supreme 
Court held that the existing habeas corpus statute required that Guantana-
mo detainees be given the chance to file habeas petitions. 10  As these 
lawsuits multiplied, Congress responded by stripping the jurisdiction of the 
federal courts to consider habeas corpus claims by alleged enemy combat-
ants.11 The detainees challenged the new statute as an unconstitutional 
suspension of habeas.12 The Bush Administration argued that the detainees 
could not access U.S. courts and had no constitutional rights because they 
were (1) aliens held outside the sovereign territory of the United States, and 
(2) enemy combatants in the custody of the U.S. military during wartime.13 
 
9 See Andrew Kent, Boumediene, Munaf, and the Supreme Court’s Misreading of the Insular 
Cases, 97 IOWA L. REV. 101, 105-06 & n.13 (2011) (describing the history and nature of the 
United States’ lease with Cuba for the Guantanamo base). 
10 See Rasul v. Bush, 542 U.S. 466, 484 (2004) (“[Section] 2241 confers on the District 
Court jurisdiction to hear petitioners’ habeas corpus challenges to the legality of their detention at 
the Guantanamo Bay Naval Base.”). 
11 See Military Commissions Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-366, § 7(a), 120 Stat. 2600, 2635-
36 (2006) (forbidding U.S. courts from hearing habeas petitions “on behalf of an alien detained by 
the United States who has been determined by the United States to have been properly detained 
as an enemy combatant or is awaiting such determination”). 
12 Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723, 732 (2008). 
13 See Brief for Respondents George W. Bush et al. at 9-10, Boumediene, 553 U.S. 723 (Nos. 
06-1195, 06-1196), 2007 WL 2972541, at *9-10. 
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Though these two justifications share a conceptual link, they played out 
very differently in the Guantanamo litigation.  
For much of American history, it was understood that not every person 
in the world could claim the protections of U.S. laws and courts.14 The 
availability of rights under the Constitution and other domestic laws, along 
with access to courts to protect those rights, depended on being within the 
protection of the laws. Protection by the United States went hand-in-hand 
with allegiance to it, and allegiance turned on both citizenship and territorial 
location. Citizens of the United States were presumptively within the 
protection of the courts and laws because they owed allegiance to their 
country, but noncitizens were a different matter.  
Noncitizens were within that protection only when they owed tempo-
rary allegiance to the United States. While present in the United States 
with the express or tacit permission of the government, aliens owed this 
temporary allegiance and they received the protection of the courts, 
domestic laws, and the Constitution. When abroad, an alien owed no 
allegiance to the United States, and U.S. domestic laws and courts offered 
no protection to the alien.15 Until 2008, the Supreme Court consistently 
held that noncitizens outside the United States could not claim protection 
under the Constitution.16 Hence, the Bush Administration’s argument in 
 
14 The following two paragraphs of main text are based on Philip Hamburger, Beyond Protec-
tion, 109 COLUM. L. REV. 1823, passim (2009); Kent, supra note 9, at 123-32; Andrew Kent, The 
Constitution and the Laws of War During the Civil War, 85 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1839, 1853-60 
(2010); J. Andrew Kent, A Textual and Historical Case Against a Global Constitution, 95 GEO. L.J. 
463, passim (2007); and Andrew Kent, The Court’s Fateful Turn in Ex parte Quirin, the Nazi 
Saboteur Case, 66 VAND. L. REV. (forthcoming 2013) [hereinafter Kent, Court’s Fateful Turn]. The 
conclusions of these articles, as summarized in the main text following this footnote, are not 
universally shared. For arguments that, in seventeenth- and eighteenth-century England, enemy 
fighters and nonresident enemy aliens could seek habeas corpus, see PAUL D. HALLIDAY, 
HABEAS CORPUS: FROM ENGLAND TO EMPIRE (2010); Paul D. Halliday & G. Edward 
White, The Suspension Clause: English Text, Imperial Contexts, and American Implications, 94 VA. L. 
REV. 575 (2008), and Stephen I. Vladeck, The New Habeas Revisionism, 124 HARV. L. REV. 941 
(2011) (reviewing HALLIDAY, supra). For arguments that this was or would have been allowed 
under U.S. law as well, see Stephen I. Vladeck, The Suspension Clause as a Structural Right, 62 U. 
MIAMI L. REV. 275 (2008) [hereinafter Vladeck, Suspension Clause], and Gerald L. Neuman, 
Closing the Guantanamo Loophole, 50 LOY. L. REV. 1 (2004).  
15 Another reason why the Constitution was not thought to protect aliens abroad was the 
fairly widespread nineteenth century view that all domestic law (including the Constitution) was 
strictly territorial, that is, had no force or effect abroad. See Kent, supra note 9, at 123-26, 124 
n.96. Some believed this concept of territoriality prevented even U.S. citizens from claiming 
extraterritorial constitutional rights. Id. at 125. 
16 The Court in Boumediene claimed that an important series of early twentieth century 
Supreme Court decisions called the Insular Cases supported its view that the Suspension Clause, 
and perhaps other individual rights provisions in the Constitution, has extraterritorial effect on 
behalf of noncitizens. See Boumediene, 553 U.S. at 756-60. But my previous work has shown that 
this proposition is simply not true and is not even an arguably plausible reading of those 
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the Guantanamo litigation about citizenship and territorial location was 
rooted in long-standing precedent and legal understandings. Though some 
have suggested that the Suspension Clause is a structural separation-of-
powers protection that was available to noncitizens abroad even during the 
era when they were understood to lack any individual constitutional rights,17 
the cases decided before Boumediene took a contrary view of the Clause—a 
view which was consistent with the Bush Administration’s first argument.18  
Moreover, prior to Boumediene, there was an important exception to the 
general rule that noncitizens present in the United States were within the 
protection of the laws and courts. Until World War II, courts and commen-
tators consistently held that enemy fighters could not access U.S. courts or 
claim rights under U.S. law during wartime.19 Fighting war against the 
United States was fundamentally inconsistent with allegiance to it and 
hence no protection was granted, even when the combatants were located in 
the United States. Therefore, the Bush Administration’s second argument 
that enemy fighter status barred court access for Guantanamo detainees also 
derived from traditional jurisprudence. 
 
decisions. See Kent, supra note 9, at 110-15. In fact, at the time of the Insular Cases, the Court, 
Congress, the executive branch, and leading commentators all agreed that the Constitution 
did not protect noncitizens outside the sovereign territory of the United States. See id. at 
120-21, 123-32, 134-36, 144, 146-49.  
17 See, e.g., Stephen I. Vladeck, Insular Thinking About Habeas, 97 IOWA L. REV. BULL. 16, 19 
(2012) (“[T]he backstop to Justice Kennedy’s analysis in Boumediene was the view that the 
Suspension Clause is a structural separation-of-powers provision, and that its scope therefore must 
be understood wholly apart from individual rights such as due process.”); Vladeck, Suspension 
Clause, supra note 14, at 302-04 (arguing that it is incorrect for the Court to conclude that the 
Suspension Clause does not apply to Guantanamo detainees simply because they are noncitizens 
outside U.S. territorial jurisdiction). 
18 The Supreme Court rejected application of the Suspension Clause to noncitizens abroad in 
Johnson v. Eisentrager, 339 U.S. 763, 781 (1950). Earlier Supreme Court decisions are consistent 
with Eisentrager’s holding on this point. See Andrew Kent, Habeas Corpus, Protection, and 
Extraterritorial Constitutional Rights: A Reply to Stephen Vladeck’s “Insular Thinking About Habeas”, 97 
IOWA L. REV. BULL. 34, 37-40 (2012) (discussing early twentieth-century cases that suggest the 
Supreme Court did not believe the Constitution required Article III habeas jurisdiction over 
challenges to executive detention arising in new overseas U.S. possessions, and, a fortiori, that 
detentions in foreign territory would not implicate the Suspension Clause either). One case 
sometimes said to support extraterritorial application of the Suspension Clause to noncitizens, In 
re Yamashita, 327 U.S. 1 (1946), arose in the Philippines and was decided when the Philippines 
was actually still American territory (independence came in July 1946, after the Supreme Court’s 
decision). In addition, the Supreme Court’s power to review Yamashita’s habeas petition by 
certiorari came from a statute expressly granting such power, 28 U.S.C. § 349 (1940), and the 
Philippine courts had power given by positive law to issue writs of habeas corpus. Because both 
habeas corpus in the local courts and appellate review in an Article III court were provided by 
statute, the Suspension Clause was not implicated.  
19 See Kent, Court’s Fateful Turn, supra note 14. 
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Despite this exception’s historical heritage and its invocation by the 
Bush Administration, the second argument did not figure prominently in 
the Guantanamo litigation. The crux of the dispute between the U.S. 
government and the Guantanamo detainees was whether the detainees were 
in fact enemy fighters or innocent civilians. The detainees argued that a 
federal court using habeas corpus, rather than executive branch agents, must 
make this crucial status determination.  
Even the Bush Administration seemed to recognize that this would have 
been a winning argument, had Guantanamo been located in the United 
States.20 And so the hard-fought litigation challenging Congress’s with-
drawal of habeas jurisdiction for Guantanamo detainees focused primarily 
on territorial location: did the fact that these noncitizens were located in 
territory that was technically not under the full sovereignty of the United 
States mean they had no right to access the courts and claim  
constitutional rights, or was Guantanamo Bay tantamount to U.S. territory 
where the Constitution required the military to provide court access  
and other rights to aliens?  
In Boumediene, the Court sided with the detainees. It held that the Sus-
pension Clause of the Constitution “has full effect at Guantanamo Bay,”21 
and that the status review procedures provided by statute and executive 
order were not constitutionally adequate substitutes for the habeas corpus 
rights guaranteed by the Constitution.22 Crucial to this decision was the 
Court’s view that “the United States, by virtue of its complete jurisdiction 
and control over the base, maintains de facto sovereignty over [Guantanamo.]”23 
After Boumediene, Guantanamo detainees litigated dozens of habeas  
cases in the federal courts. 
In a report published in early 2010, President Obama’s Guantanamo 
Review Task Force declared that of the 240 detainees subject to review, 126 
had been approved for transfer, but only 44 had been transferred to 
countries outside the United States. 24  In addition, 44 detainees were 
deemed eligible for prosecution in federal or military court, 48 were 
declared too dangerous to transfer but not “feasible for prosecution,” and 30 
detainees from Yemen were designated for “‘conditional’ detention” due to 
 
20 See Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 525 (2004) (plurality opinion) (“All [parties] agree 
that, absent suspension, the writ of habeas corpus remains available to every individual detained 
within the United States.”). 
21 Boumediene, 553 U.S. at 771. 
22 Id. at 789.  
23 Id. at 755. 
24 See GUANTANAMO REVIEW TASK FORCE, FINAL REPORT ii (2010), available at http://  
www.justice.gov/ag/guantanamo-review-final-report.pdf. 
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instability in Yemen at the time.25 As of early fall 2012, there were still 168 
detainees at Guantanamo.26 Many of those not cleared for release have 
litigated habeas cases, and to date, federal courts have adjudicated the cases 
of about 60 detainees.27 It is difficult to neatly tally “wins” and “losses” for 
the detainees and the government in the habeas cases, but doing so is not 
necessary here in any case. It suffices for this Essay to say that the federal 
courts have determined that dozens of detainees are al Qaeda or Taliban enemy 
combatants, a group I will call the “judicially-confirmed enemy fighters.”28  
Before turning to the question of whether Boumediene rights have ex-
pired for judicially-confirmed enemy fighters, it will be useful to clarify 
what kinds of claims these detainees might want to bring in the future. A 
number of detainees have already brought suits for money damages 
challenging various aspects of their treatment in custody, but Congress 
withdrew the federal courts’ jurisdiction over these suits in 2006,29 and the 
D.C. Circuit has upheld the constitutionality of Congress’s act.30 That 
holding seems likely to be affirmed if it reaches the Supreme Court;31 thus, 
damages suits are not an option.  
 
25 Id.  
26 See In re Guantanamo Bay Detainee Continued Access to Counsel, No. 12-398, 2012 WL 
4039707, at *1 (D.D.C. Sept. 6, 2012). 
27 See Clive Stafford Smith, Guantánamo Bay: Statistics, REPRIEVE (July 28, 2012), http://  
www.reprieve.org.uk/publiceducation/guantanamostats/.  
28 There are two other classes of detainees totaling only a small number of individuals, that 
are legally equivalent to “judicially-confirmed enemy fighters.” First, some detainees never filed, 
or filed then dropped, habeas cases. They have conceded by implicit waiver of their right to habeas 
that the executive branch’s classification of them as enemy fighters is correct. Second, a few 
detainees are held pursuant to a judgment of a military commission that they committed one or 
more war crimes. Such judgments require a threshold finding that the detainees were enemy 
fighters. See 10 U.S.C. §§ 948a(7), 948b(a) (Supp. III 2010) (replacing a similar provision, section 
3(a)(1) of the Military Commissions Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-366, 120 Stat. 2600, and 
establishing procedures for trying “unprivileged enemy belligerents”). Convicted defendants have 
a right to appellate review by the D.C. Circuit and may petition the Supreme Court for certiorari. 
See 10 U.S.C. § 950(g) (Supp. III 2010). As a result, an Article III court will have found detainees 
held pursuant to a final judgment of a military commission to be enemy fighters, just like 
detainees who litigated but lost their habeas cases.  
29 See Military Commissions Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-366, § 7(a), 120 Stat. 2600, 2635-
36 (codified at 28 U.S.C. § 2241(e)(2) (Supp. II 2009)).  
30 See Al-Zahrani v. Rodriguez, 669 F.3d 315, 319-20 (D.C. Cir. 2012). 
31 So-called Bivens suits for money damages are highly disfavored by the courts today, espe-
cially when they are brought by noncitizens challenging national security policies. See Benjamin 
Wittes, Andrew Kent on Al-Aulaqi and Bivens, LAWFARE (Aug. 3, 2012, 7:44 AM), http://  
www.lawfareblog.com/2012/08/andrew-kent-on-al-aulaqi-and-bivens/. Even when Bivens suits go 
forward, qualified immunity prevents many litigants from recovering. See, e.g., Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 
556 U.S. 662, 672 (2009). As a result, it is hard to imagine a winning argument that Congress had 
violated detainees’ constitutional rights by precluding damages suits—suits that would likely be 
blocked because of qualified immunity and limitations on Bivens. This is especially true because 
the detainees are noncitizens outside the United States and, to date, the only constitutional right 
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The most important type of claim that judicially-confirmed enemy 
fighters at Guantanamo will want to bring is a second round of habeas 
challenges to either the factual or legal basis of their detentions. When facts 
change—for instance, if newly discovered information showed that a 
detainee was not in fact an enemy fighter—the detainees and their counsel 
will want to return to court. Once the United States withdraws from its 
combat mission in Afghanistan, Taliban detainees at Guantanamo will most 
likely claim that the factual predicate for their detention has ended.32 Given 
the United States’ success in eliminating al Qaeda fighters, including many 
top leaders, detainees held because of their al Qaeda associations might in 
the future claim that America’s war with the group has effectively terminat-
ed, ending the justification for detaining them.33 Detainees may also invoke 
the Court’s language in Hamdi that suggested that, even if the conflict with 
al Qaeda, the Taliban, and affiliates does not in fact end, “[i]f the practical 
circumstances” of that conflict “are entirely unlike those of the conflicts that 
informed the development of the law of war,” the “understanding” that 
detention is authorized for the duration of the conflict may over time 
“unravel.”34 Even without viable legal claims, lawyers for detainees will still 
desire to represent their clients in other ways, for instance by pressing for 
better conditions of confinement or for detainees’ release or repatriation.  
 
that the Supreme Court has clearly confirmed they have is the Suspension Clause protection 
announced in Boumediene. See Boumediene, 553 U.S. at 771 (holding that Congress must “act in 
accordance with the requirements of the Suspension Clause” if it intends to suspend habeas corpus 
for Guantanamo detainees). It should be noted though that Boumediene and Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 
548 U.S. 557 (2006), are probably best read as implicitly granting Due Process Clause rights and a 
right to raise separation-of-powers claims to detainees at Guantanamo. See Kent, Court’s Fateful 
Turn, supra note 14. For an argument that the Supreme Court could decide the question raised in 
Al-Zahrani, see supra note 30, in favor of the plaintiff, see Steve Vladeck, The Subtle New (Constitu-
tional) Holding in Al-Zahrani, LAWFARE (Feb. 21, 2012, 2:47 PM), http://www.lawfareblog.com/ 
2012/02/the-subtle-new-constitutional-holding-in-al-zahrani/.  
32 See generally Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 518 (2004) (plurality opinion) (approving 
detention of an alleged Taliban fighter “for the duration of the particular conflict” under law-of-
war principles implicitly adopted by the AUMF). For a rich discussion of how changes in the 
conflict with al Qaeda and the Taliban, including the removal of most U.S. troops from 
Afghanistan, are likely to affect future detention litigation and other legal issues, see Robert M. 
Chesney, Beyond the Battlefield, Beyond Al Qaeda: The Destabilizing Legal Architecture of Counterter-
rorism, 112 MICH. L. REV. (forthcoming 2012), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/ 
papers.cfm?abstract_id=2138623.  
33 See, e.g., Peter Bergen, Time to Declare Victory: al Qaeda Is Defeated, CNN SEC. CLEAR-
ANCE (June 27, 2012, 12:01 AM), http://security.blogs.cnn.com/2012/06/27/time-to-declare-
victory-al-qaeda-is-defeated-opinion/ (quoting the Secretary of Defense and President Obama 
predicting that a strategic defeat of al Qaeda is within reach). 
34 Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 521 (plurality opinion). 
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II. HAVE BOUMEDIENE RIGHTS EXPIRED FOR JUDICIALLY-
CONFIRMED ENEMY FIGHTERS? 
A. The Law Before Boumediene 
Do the rights announced in Boumediene expire once an Article III court 
determines that a detainee is an enemy fighter? There is no easy answer to 
this important question.  
Prior to Boumediene, three Supreme Court cases—all arising from World 
War II—addressed whether enemy fighters could access U.S. courts and 
claim rights under domestic law during wartime. The first, Ex parte Quirin, 
involved German military agents who snuck into the United States on a 
sabotage mission during the war, and who, once captured, filed petitions for 
habeas corpus.35 All but one were German nationals; the other claimed to be 
a U.S. citizen.36 The government argued that neither nonresident enemy 
aliens nor enemy fighters had ever had the right to access U.S. courts or to 
claim domestic legal rights during wartime. 37  The Court rejected this 
argument and allowed the saboteurs to access the courts via habeas.38 
However, the Court did not explain why it overturned longstanding rules to 
permit this court access.39 Later interpreters have understood Quirin to mean 
that any person present in U.S. territory has a right to habeas corpus.40  
The second case, In re Yamashita,41 arose in the Philippines, at the time a 
U.S. territory. A Japanese army general was charged with war crimes, and 
he filed a writ of habeas corpus in order to challenge his military commis-
sion trial.42 Over the Executive’s objections, but citing Quirin, the Court 
held that the general could access U.S. courts via habeas.43 The third case 
arose a few years later. In Johnson v. Eisentrager,44 the Court confronted 
habeas corpus petitions brought by German military agents convicted of 
war crimes by a U.S. military tribunal in China and subsequently detained 
in U.S.-occupied Germany.45 Pointing to their status as nonresident enemy 
aliens and enemy fighters, and their location outside the United States, the 
 
35 317 U.S. 1, 19-22 (1942).  
36 Id. at 20. 
37 Id. at 24-25. 
38 Id. at 25. 
39 See Kent, Court’s Fateful Turn, supra note 14. 
40 See id. 
41 327 U.S. 1 (1946). 
42 Id. at 5-6. 
43 See id. at 9. 
44 339 U.S. 763 (1950). 
45 Id. at 766. 
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Court in Eisentrager held that these agents had no right to access U.S. courts 
and claim rights under U.S. law.46  
These three cases were the most recent precedents concerning enemy 
fighters when the Guantanamo detainees began to file their habeas petitions.  
On one reading of the cases, the question about continuing court access 
for judicially-confirmed enemy fighters at Guantanamo looks straightfor-
ward. Just like the claimants in Eisentrager, the judicially-confirmed enemy 
fighters at Guantanamo are (1) noncitizens (2) held outside the United 
States who (3) either admitted, or were found by an Article III court to be, 
enemy fighters. If Eisentrager was the most recent Court precedent, it would 
be easy to say, based both on Eisentrager’s authority as well as on the 
negative implications of the Quirin and Yamashita rule regarding location 
within the United States, that the judicially-confirmed enemy fighters at 
Guantanamo no longer have any constitutional right to access the courts. 
But Boumediene has intervened. Though the Court there read Eisentrager in 
a thoroughly unconvincing manner—as turning not only upon enemy 
status, citizenship, and territorial location, but also on a host of practical 
equities47 —it is now the law of the land.  
B. Beyond Boumediene 
Boumediene did not expressly address whether the rights it announced 
would expire upon judicial confirmation of enemy fighter status. There is 
language in the opinion suggesting divergent interpretations. The Court’s 
holding was that the Suspension Clause “has full effect at Guantanamo 
Bay,”48 and it seems to treat common law habeas as a baseline or floor for 
the detainee’s court-access rights.49 As Professor Steve Vladeck has pointed 
out, “in the executive detention context, it has long been recognized that 
habeas at common law recognizes no bar to filing second or successive 
petitions, including res judicata.”50 Therefore, the argument would go, the 
Boumediene court-access rights of the detainees would never expire. 
But Boumediene is more complicated than this reading allows, both as to 
claims that might fall under a res judicata bar and to truly new claims. It is 
 
46 Id. at 784-85. 
47 See Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723, 762-64, 766 (2008). 
48 Id. at 771.  
49 Id. at 779-80 (describing the attributes of a constitutionally adequate habeas proceeding, 
and noting that the exact requirements of such a proceeding depend on the circumstances). 
50 Steve Vladeck, Habeas, Res Judicata, and Why the New Guantanamo MOU Is a Big Deal, 
LAWFARE (July 17, 2012, 5:13 PM), http://www.lawfareblog.com/2012/07/habeas-res-judicata-
and-why-the-new-guantanamo-mou-is-a-big-deal/; see also McCleskey v. Zant, 499 U.S. 467, 479 
(1991) (“At common law, res judicata did not attach to a court’s denial of habeas relief.”). 
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true that the eighteenth-century common law tradition upon which the 
Boumediene Court relied contains no bar to filing successive habeas 
petitions, including res judicata. But that common law rule prevailed when 
there was no appellate review of habeas denials; a new petition was the only 
way to secure higher court review.51 Once appellate review became availa-
ble, U.S. courts and then Congress shaped the doctrine of “abuse-of-the-
writ” by essentially importing res judicata principles into the habeas 
context.52 Applying this change to the common law in the Guantanamo 
litigation—where appellate review for the determination of enemy fighter 
status was available—would not seem to be foreclosed by the Boumediene 
decision or any strong policy arguments.53 Therefore, res judicata principles 
could be used to bar successive habeas petitions that raised issues already 
decided or which could have been raised earlier. 
And what about successive habeas petitions raising truly new factual or 
legal claims? 54  Boumediene was premised on the recognition that the 
detainees were requesting something exceptional. As the Court noted, 
“before today the Court has never held that noncitizens detained by our 
Government in territory over which another country maintains de jure 
sovereignty have any rights under our Constitution.” 55  Whether their 
exceptional claim to constitutional protection would be accepted depended, 
the Court held, on balancing a variety of factors such as citizenship, enemy 
status, territorial location, the military and diplomatic situation in the 
territory of detention and other practical equities.56 Notably, many of these 
factors are clearly likely to change over time—meaning that the Court’s test 
contemplates that the propriety of recognizing exceptional habeas rights for 
noncitizens abroad could change over time. One significant factor in 
Boumediene’s test for whether noncitizens outside the United States have 
habeas rights was the “status of the detainee and the adequacy of the process 
 
51 See McCleskey, 499 U.S. at 479. 
52 Id. at 479-89 (explaining how the right to appellate review undermined the rationale for 
allowing “endless successive petitions”). 
53 The Boumediene Court recognized that the Suspension Clause does not mandate full-blown 
common law habeas; it confirmed the long-standing rule that alternate procedures are constitu-
tionally permissible if they are an “adequate substitute” for regular habeas. 553 U.S. at 771. As the 
Court noted, it has previously sustained a statutory ban on abusive second or successive habeas 
petitions in the context of state prisoners seeking post-conviction habeas relief in federal court. See 
id. at 774 (discussing Felker v. Turpin, 518 U.S. 651, 662-664 (1996)). As the Court has said 
repeatedly in the post-conviction habeas context, there is little value in allowing either repeated 
bites at the apple or piecemeal litigation of claims which could have been brought earlier.  
54 For predictions about what types of claims will be made in the future, see supra notes 32-34 and 
accompanying text. 
55 Boumediene, 553 U.S. at 770. 
56 Id. at 798; see also supra note 4. 
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through which that status determination was made.”57 When they went to 
the Supreme Court in 2007 seeking habeas rights, the detainees were not 
enemy aliens because they were from nations at peace with the United 
States.58 And crucially, they claimed to be innocent civilians.59 The execu-
tive branch had determined that they were enemy fighters, but only 
through a military administrative process recently supplemented by limited 
judicial review,60 all of which the Supreme Court found deficient in numerous 
respects.61  
Things are different now, and applying Boumediene’s test to these de-
tainees’ changed circumstances arguably yields a different result today. The 
judicially-confirmed enemy fighters have had their day in court. Those who 
filed habeas petitions had their claims adjudicated before independent, 
highly competent Article III judges sitting in the District of Columbia. 
They were assisted by counsel. Their counsel, in turn, received access to 
large amounts of information from the government, thereby allowing them 
to contest the government’s allegations. And they lost—judges found that 
the government proved that they were enemy fighters who could be 
detained for the duration of hostilities. So today, their “status” is no longer 
that of innocent civilian but of confirmed enemy fighter. And the “process 
through which that status determination was made”62 was a fulsome, judicial 
process conducted in federal court, not a deficient military administrative 
process. Based on this aspect of Boumediene, one could argue that the 
changed status of these detainees via judicial process means that the 
judicially-confirmed enemy fighters at Guantanamo no longer enjoy the 
constitutional rights to habeas corpus announced in Boumediene.  
But this argument for the expiration of Boumediene rights can and will be 
challenged. If lower courts or the Supreme Court review whether 
Boumediene rights have expired, they might well decide that there is a great 
need for continuing judicial review of executive detention practices because 
the war on terror is a novel conflict of uncertain duration with an ever-
present possibility of overreaching or mistakes in detention decisions. The 
Boumediene Court stressed that in order to protect individual liberty, the 
separation of powers generally requires independent judicial review of 
executive detentions.63 A court might hold that this structural need for 
 
57 Boumediene, 553 U.S. at 766. 
58 Id. at 734. 
59 Id. at 766. 
60 Id. at 734. 
61 Id. at 792. 
62 Id. at 766. 
63  For a description of Justice Kennedy’s reliance on the idea that separation of powers 
demanded the federal courts’ jurisdiction see infra note 89 and accompanying text. 
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judicial review persists even after judicial confirmation of enemy fighter 
status. Or, a court might double-down on the view that Guantanamo is 
quasi-U.S. territory and invoke the rule derived from Quirin and Yamashita 
that admitted even enemy fighters of a hostile nation’s military have a right 
to habeas if they are located within the United States.  
The decision in Boumediene does not conclusively explain how the Su-
preme Court would rule on whether Boumediene rights have expired for 
judicially-confirmed enemy fighters. My suspicion is that the current Court 
would be exceedingly reluctant to relinquish the habeas jurisdiction over 
Guantanamo which it so dramatically claimed in Boumediene, Hamdan,64 and 
Rasul.65 However, both Boumediene and Rasul were 5–4 decisions,66 and so 
future changes to the Court’s membership could of course shift the  
balance. In recent years, Congress has enacted three important statutes  
concerning judicial review of detentions at Guantanamo;67 thus, if Congress  
chooses to address this issue again, future legislation could also affect  
Boumediene’s continuing legacy. 
III. MAY THE GOVERNMENT WAIVE THE ARGUMENT THAT 
BOUMEDIENE RIGHTS HAVE EXPIRED? 
The Obama Administration recently informed a district court coordinat-
ing Guantanamo habeas litigation that it will not argue that Boumediene 
rights to court access have expired for judicially-confirmed enemy fight-
ers.68 However, the Executive’s concession should not be the end of the 
matter. In general, access to courts for enemy fighters and noncitizens 
located abroad may be a nonwaivable jurisdictional requirement that federal 
courts have an obligation to examine sua sponte. Unfortunately, the 
Supreme Court has been inconsistent and unclear in its description of the 
court-access inquiry, and have characterized it variously as an issue of 
standing, civil capacity to sue, subject matter jurisdiction, separation of 
powers, and individual constitutional rights.69 Whether a party may waive 
 
64 Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557 (2006). 
65 Rasul v. Bush, 542 U.S. 466 (2004). 
66 Hamdan would almost certainly have been 5–4 also, had Chief Justice Roberts not recused 
himself because he was part of the D.C. Circuit panel whose decision was being reviewed. See 
Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 415 F.3d 33 (D.C. Cir. 2005). Due to the recusal, the detainee prevailed in 
the Supreme Court 5–3.  
67 Relevant provisions of the Military Commissions Act of 2006 and the National Defense 
Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2012 are noted in notes 7, 11, 29 and accompanying text, supra. 
The third provision is section 1005(e) of the Detainee Treatment Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-
148, 119 Stat. 2680, 2741-42 (codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000dd–2000dd-1 (2006)). 
68 See supra note 8. 
69 See infra Section III.A. 
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an argument, and whether courts must sua sponte raise an issue vary 
depending on which of these characterizations is correct. Despite this 
uncertainty about general principles, court access under Boumediene is, in 
the specific context of Guantanamo, an issue of a federal court’s subject 
matter jurisdiction that almost certainly cannot be waived and must be raised 
sua sponte by the courts. 
A. Just What Kind of Right Is the Right to Court Access? 
In a number of nineteenth century cases, the Court described wartime 
court access for civilian enemy aliens as a question of “standing.”70 The 
Eisentrager Court also used the language of “standing” to describe its inquiry 
into court access for enemy fighters who were also nonresident enemy 
aliens.71 If court access is indeed an aspect of standing, it might be a non-
waivable requirement that federal courts must raise sua sponte, just like 
Article III and prudential standing under current doctrine.72 
But it seems a stretch to equate court access with standing. The “critical 
question” in modern standing doctrine is whether the plaintiff has “alleged 
such a personal stake in the outcome of the controversy as to warrant his 
invocation of federal-court jurisdiction.”73 A detainee undoubtedly has a 
direct and personal stake in litigation about the lawfulness of his detention. 
In other cases, the Court has described court access for civilian alien 
enemies as a question of civil capacity to sue.74 If that is the correct descrip-
tion of the court-access issue, the strict rules imposed by the standing 
doctrine do not apply—a litigant may waive objections to the adversary’s 
 
70 See, e.g., Mrs. Alexander’s Cotton, 69 U.S. (2 Wall.) 404, 421 (1864) (“Mrs. Alexander, 
being now a resident in enemy territory, and in law an enemy, can have no standing in any court 
of the United States so long as that relation shall exist.”). 
71 See Johnson v. Eisentrager, 339 U.S. 763, 776 (“The standing of the enemy alien to main-
tain any action in the courts of the United States has been often challenged and sometimes 
denied.”); id. at 777 (explaining that in order to find the German agents had “standing to demand 
access to our courts” the Court would have to depart from all precedent and historical practice). 
72 See Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Mineta, 534 U.S. 103, 110 (2001) (per curiam) (noting 
that Article III standing must be evaluated sua sponte by the courts); De Jesus Ramirez v. Reich, 
156 F.3d 1273, 1276 (D.C. Cir. 1998) (stating that the court is obliged to independently examine 
whether prudential standing requirements are met). 
73 Horne v. Flores, 557 U.S. 433, 445 (2009) (quoting Summers v. Earth Island Inst.,  
555 U.S. 488, 493 (2009)). 
74 See, e.g., Ex parte Kawato, 317 U.S. 69, 74 (1942) (stating, in a case involving court access 
of a civilian, resident enemy alien, that "[a] lawful residence implies protection, and a capacity to 
sue and be sued” (internal citation and quotation marks omitted)); Conrad v. Waples, 96 U.S. 
279, 289-90 (1877) (“During the war, the property of alien enemies is subject to confiscation jure 
belli, and their civil capacity to sue is suspended.”). Premodern references to “standing,” see supra 
note 70 and accompanying text, are probably best read as referring to civil capacity to sue.  
Kent.docx (DO NOT DELETE) 11/13/2012 12:53 PM 
34 University of Pennsylvania Law Review PENNumbra [Vol. 161: 20 
lack of capacity75 and courts may, but are not required to, raise it sua 
sponte.76 In some older American and English cases about civilian alien 
enemies, it appears that judges allowed litigants to waive the argument 
about court access.77 And at common law, the sovereign could choose to 
grant protection, including the right to sue, to nonresident alien enemies, 
who would otherwise be barred from the courts, based on policy considerations.78 
Court access for enemy fighters involves issues of constitutional dimen-
sion, implicating war powers, separation of powers, and individual rights, 
whereas today, an individual’s civil capacity to sue is a question of state 
law.79 But this does not mean that court access does not concern civil 
capacity. Prior to the 2006 jurisdiction-stripping legislation at issue in 
Boumediene, statutes providing habeas and general federal question jurisdic-
tion did not contain exceptions based on alien or enemy status. In the older 
cases, the bar on court access for nonresident enemy aliens and enemy 
fighters was said to arise from the common law and law of nations (today’s 
customary international law); these limitations created implied exceptions 
to both jurisdictional statutes and to constitutional provisions which 
otherwise would have allowed court access, such as the Suspension Clause 
or the Due Process Clause.80 The law of nations and the common law 
applicable to cases about enemy court access were understood to be forms of 
general law or state law, but not federal law.81 Thus the fact that personal 
capacity to sue is a question of state law does not mean it is an inaccurate 
description of the court-access inquiry.  
 
75 See, e.g., Wagner Furniture Interiors, Inc. v. Kemner’s Georgetown Manor, Inc., 929  
F.2d 343, 345-46 (7th Cir. 1991) (stating that a party must raise lack of capacity to sue or the  
defense will be waived). 
76 See, e.g., Ferrelli v. River Manor Health Care Ctr., 323 F.3d 196, 201 (2d Cir. 2003) 
(explaining that no federal rule of procedure nor any case precedent impose an obligation upon the 
court to inquire sua sponte into a pro se plaintiff’s mental competence). 
77 See, e.g., Levine v. Taylor, 12 Mass. (1 Tyng) 8, 9 (1815); Hoppen v. Leppett, (1737) 95 
Eng. Rep. 305, 305-06 (K.B.). 
78 See, e.g., Crawford v. William Penn, 6 F. Cas. 778, 779 (C.C.D.N.J. 1815) (No. 3372). See 
generally 1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *372 (“[A]lien enemies have no rights, no 
privileges, unless by the king’s special favour, during the time of war.”). 
79 See FED. R. CIV. P. 17(b)(1). 
80 See Kent, Court’s Fateful Turn, supra note 14. 
81 See Curtis A. Bradley & Jack L. Goldsmith, Customary International Law as Federal Com-
mon Law: A Critique of the Modern Position, 110 HARV. L. REV. 815, 820-25 (1997) (describing how 
prior to Erie Railroad Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938), most considered the law of nations to 
be general law or state law). 
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B. Clues in Boumediene 
There is language in leading Supreme Court cases suggesting that court 
access might not be a question of civil capacity, but might instead concern 
subject matter jurisdiction, another requirement courts must raise sua 
sponte and that litigants may not waive.82 Subject matter jurisdiction refers 
to “the courts’ statutory or constitutional power to adjudicate the case.”83 In 
its brief reference to the court-access dispute, the Quirin Court discussed 
whether the Court had authority to hear the case, perhaps indicating that 
the Justices were thinking in terms of subject matter jurisdiction.84 The 
Eisentrager Court repeatedly described the issue of court access as one of 
jurisdiction85 and the court’s power to hear the case.86 Justice Kennedy—
who has been the crucial swing vote in the war on terror court-access cases 
and who wrote the majority opinion in Boumediene—discussed Eisentrager at 
length in his concurrence in Rasul.87 There, he framed Eisentrager as raising 
a jurisdictional question and holding that “there was no jurisdiction for the 
courts to hear the prisoner’s claims” because “there is a realm of political 
authority over military affairs where the judicial power may not enter.”88 In 
Boumediene, however, Justice Kennedy dialed back the references to 
jurisdiction. His majority opinion repeatedly framed the issues presented as 
concerning separation of powers89 and individual constitutional rights under 
the Suspension Clause,90 while only occasionally referring to jurisdiction 
 
82 See Kontrick v. Ryan, 540 U.S. 443, 456 (2004) (“Characteristically, a court’s subject-
matter jurisdiction cannot be expanded to account for the parties’ litigation conduct.”); Steel Co. v. 
Citizens for a Better Env’t, 523 U.S. 83, 93 (1998) (explaining that courts have an obligation to 
inquire into subject matter jurisdiction sua sponte). 
83 Steel Co., 523 U.S. at 89; accord Reed Elsevier, Inc. v. Muchnick, 130 S. Ct. 1237, 1243-44 (2010). 
84 See Ex parte Quirin, 317 U.S. 1, 25 (1942). 
85 See Johnson v. Eisentrager, 339 U.S. 763, 765 (1950) (“The ultimate question in this case 
is one of jurisdiction of civil courts of the United States vis-à-vis military authorities in dealing 
with enemy aliens overseas.”); id. at 780 (distinguishing other cases allowing access to the courts 
because “[n]one of these heads of jurisdiction can be invoked by these prisoners”). 
86 Id. at 771 (“[I]n extending constitutional protections beyond the citizenry, the Court has 
been at pains to point out that it was the alien’s presence within its territorial jurisdiction that 
gave the Judiciary power to act.”); id. at 790 (“[I]n the present application we find no basis for 
invoking federal judicial power . . . .”); id. at 767 (describing the lower court’s decision it reversed 
as holding that “although no statutory jurisdiction of such cases is given, courts must be held to 
possess it as part of the judicial power of the United States . . . .”); see also id. at 796 (Black, J., 
dissenting) (viewing the holding as going to “power” of Court to act). 
87 Rasul v. Bush, 542 U.S. 466, 485 (2004) (Kennedy, J., concurring) (“[T]he correct course 
is to follow the framework of Eisentrager.”). 
88 Id. at 486-87. 
89 See Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723, 742-43, 746, 755, 764-65, 772, 797 (2008). 
90 See, e.g., id. at 744 (“[T]he [Suspension] Clause . . . guarantees an affirmative right to 
judicial inquiry into the causes of detention.”); id. at 770 (“It is true that before today the Court 
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and the federal courts’ power to hear the case. 91  Because Boumediene 
involved a jurisdiction-stripping statute and the Court clearly viewed the 
Suspension Clause as supplying the removed subject matter jurisdiction (or 
voiding Congress’s attempt to remove the preexisting statutory subject 
matter jurisdiction), the Boumediene majority’s reticence about discussing 
the issue in jurisdictional terms is odd. In contrast to the majority opinion, 
Justice Scalia’s dissent (joined by the Chief Justice and Justices Alito  
and Thomas), and a concurring opinion of Justice Souter (joined by  
Justices Ginsburg and Breyer), framed the issue as primarily one of  
subject matter jurisdiction.92  
As noted, the Boumediene Court repeatedly relied upon the constitution-
al separation of powers. In prior centuries, courts have considered court 
access for enemy fighters to raise separation-of-powers issues.93 Separation-
of-powers violations are not waivable and cannot be cured by the consent of 
the affected branch of government.94 It has not been clearly decided, but it is 
likely that federals courts may raise separation-of-powers defects sua sponte. 
In sum, there is a decided lack of clarity in prior Supreme Court cases 
about what the court-access question involves—standing, civil capacity to 
sue, subject matter jurisdiction, individual constitutional rights, separation 
of powers, some combination of these, or something else entirely. The best 
answer seems to be that court access via habeas for enemy fighters or aliens 
outside the United States is a mixed question of individual constitutional 
rights under the Suspension and Due Process Clauses, capacity to sue, 
separation of powers, and subject matter jurisdiction. But this lack of clarity 
about general principles is not especially significant in the specific context 
 
has never held that noncitizens detained by our Government in territory over which another 
country maintains de jure sovereignty have any rights under our Constitution.”).  
91 See, e.g., id. at 745 (“The [Suspension] Clause protects the rights of the detained by affirm-
ing the duty and authority of the Judiciary to call the jailer to account.”); id. at 793 (“In light of 
our conclusion that there is no jurisdictional bar to the District Court’s entertaining petitioners’ 
claims the question remains whether there are prudential barriers to habeas corpus review  
under these circumstances.”). 
92 See id. at 834, 843 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (“And that is precisely the question in these 
cases: whether the Constitution confers habeas jurisdiction on federal courts to decide petitioners’ 
claims.”); id. at 799 (Souter, J., concurring) (writing that “there must be constitutionally  
based jurisdiction or none at all,” and finding that the constitution mandated the result  
reached by the majority). 
93 See Johnson v. Eisentrager, 339 U.S. 763, 797 (1950); Moxon v. Fanny, 17 F. Cas. 942, 
947 (D. Pa. 1793) (No. 9895); Lockington’s Case (Pa. 1814) (opinion of Brackenridge, J.), in 
REPORTS OF CASES DECIDED BY THE JUDGES OF THE SUPREME COURT OF PENNSYLVA-
NIA, IN THE COURT OF NISI PRIUS AT PHILADELPHIA, AND ALSO IN THE SUPREME 
COURT 283, 296 (Frederick C. Brightly ed., Phila., James Kay Jr. & Bro. Pub. 1851). 
94 See Commodity Futures Trading Comm’n v. Schor, 478 U.S. 833, 850-51 (1986) (stating 
that consent cannot cure harm to the “structural principle[s]” of the Constitution). 
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of the Guantanamo saga, because Congress’s jurisdiction-stripping statute 
and Boumediene’s rejection of it have made clear that court access for these 
detainees does in fact go to subject matter jurisdiction. And that means that 
the Executive cannot waive the issue. It also means the courts must raise 
the issue sua sponte and decide the question of continued court access for 
judicially-confirmed enemy fighters. 
IV. SHOULD THE GOVERNMENT PRESS THE ARGUMENT THAT 
BOUMEDIENE RIGHTS HAVE EXPIRED? 
Notwithstanding that federal courts have an independent duty to raise 
this jurisdictional issue sua sponte, there are weighty policy reasons 
supporting the Obama Administration’s decision to refrain from seeking to 
bar additional litigation by judicially-confirmed fighters held at Guantanamo. 
For one thing, consider the types of claims that such detainees might bring. 
Under a 2006 statute, Guantanamo detainees cannot bring damages actions, 
which leaves primarily successive habeas petitions. Habeas litigation 
imposes significant costs on the government. It requires the time and 
attention of executive officials and judges, money, disclosure of sensitive 
intelligence information through discovery or court filings, and the sacrifice 
of actions beneficial to national security not taken because of fear of 
litigation implications. The litigation also creates a focal point for condem-
nation of U.S. policies by domestic and international critics. But these costs 
should not be too onerous going forward because most were incurred during 
the first round of habeas litigation and cannot be undone. The additional 
costs of future litigation should not be too great given the relatively small 
and declining number of detainees at Guantanamo. Thus if a detainee 
previously confirmed by the courts to be an enemy fighter comes forward 
with new information casting doubt on his enemy status, it is hard to see 
why the government has a strong interest in barring that claim. If the 
conflicts with the Taliban and al Qaeda peter out and the Executive 
continues to hold detainees, the detainees will have a legitimate legal gripe 
because law-of-war detention should end when the conflict does. If the 
government believes that good policy reasons and sound legal bases remain 
to hold detainees, it should probably welcome the error-correction and 
legitimating functions that continued judicial review would provide.95  
This raises another consideration: the domestic and international public 
perceptions of the legitimacy of U.S. policies. It is widely agreed that 
 
95 See generally JACK GOLDSMITH, POWER AND CONSTRAINT 188-201 (2012) (arguing 
that counter-terrorism policies have gained significant legitimacy as a result of judicial review and 
other means of accountability).  
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Guantanamo harmed relations with many allies and angered some important 
domestic constituencies. It is hard to see why the President would find it 
advantageous to restart the controversy about Guantanamo being a “legal 
black hole,”96 especially since the costs of future litigation for judicially-
confirmed fighters will likely be much lower than the costs already borne.  
* * * 
For these or similar reasons, Obama Administration policymakers are 
unwilling, for now at least, to press the argument against the continuation 
of Boumediene rights. A future administration might well weigh the equities 
differently. Whenever and in whatever precise form the issue arises, it is a 
near certainty that courts in the future will need to decide whether 
Boumediene rights to court access have expired or at least diminished for 
judicially-confirmed enemy fighters at Guantanamo. The Supreme Court 
may need to weigh in yet again. There are aspects of Boumediene and prior 
precedents which support the notion that judicially-confirmed enemy 
fighters lack any additional right to access the courts, but other aspects of 
Boumediene, as well as some policy considerations, point the other way. The 
legal battles about Guantanamo, which have already lasted a decade, are 
likely far from over. 
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96 Detainees’ lawyers are already arguing (perhaps a bit hyperbolically) that the Administra-
tion’s move to place some restrictions on counsel access for judicially-confirmed enemy fighters 
who have no pending litigation has helped recreate “the status quo” circa 2002–2004 “when 
Guantanamo was iconic for denying human beings legal rights or access to the outside world.” 
Baher Azmy, Obama Turns Back the Clock on Guantanamo, WASH. POST (Aug. 16, 2012), at A19, 
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/2012/08/16/e97f10c2-e62c-11e1-936a-b801f1abab19_story.html.  
